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Evidence-Expert Testimony: Admissibility of Human Factors
Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
In recent years courts have liberalized the standards for admission of ex-
pert testimony. Federal Rules of Evidence 702 through 705 reflect this trend
and are now in effect in many states as well as in the federal court system.I To
be admissible under the rules, expert testimony need only assist the trier of
fact.2 Furthermore, a qualified expert is allowed to give opinions on ultimate
issues, 3 which were previously reserved for determination by the trier of fact.
Certain ultimate issues, including conclusions concerning whether a particular
legal standard is satisfied, are still inappropriate for expert testimony, how-
ever, because simply telling the jury the result to reach does not constitute
assistance. Moreover, when the mode of analysis applied by an expert lacks
scientific reliability, there is a further danger that the expert's testimony will
not assist but, instead, mislead. Human-factors analysis testimony demon-
strates both of these dangers.
According to a practitioner in the field, human-factors analysis is the
"study of all the factors which combine to influence the decision of the indi-
vidual, such as past experience, present feelings, and immediate motor re-
sponse in terms of the present situation or environment."4 In a line of recent
Florida cases involving railroad crossing accidents,5 several psychologists and
engineers have qualified as human factors experts and have been permitted to
give their opinions on the probable behavior of the average or reasonable per-
son in the actual accident settings. Assuming human-factors testimony satis-
fies the threshold test of assistance to the jury, the Florida courts nevertheless
have failed to consider qualifications of the proferred experts adequately, ne-
glected to determine whether human-factors analysis is scientifically reliable
and overlooked the problem that expert testimony on the behavior of a reason-
able person is not permitted even under the present ultimate issue rule.
6
I. The Federal Rules of Evidence took effect in United States courts on July 1, 1975. Pub.
L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). Twenty-one states have adopted these rules with omis-
sions and variations. Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (state correlation tables) (1981).
2. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
3. Id. 704.
4. Public Health Foundation v. Cole, 352 So. 2d 877, 879 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert.
denied, 361 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1978). The witness provided this explanation of human engineering,
his subspecialty. Another human-factors specialist has defined his field as the study of how a
human uses and interacts with his products. Fowler, Human Factors Analysis, 10 Trial, Nov.-
Dec. 1974, at 53. "Products" presumably refers to items such as consumer goods found in the
home and more complicated devices like automobiles.
5. See text accompanying notes 7-41 infra.
6. The Florida legislature substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1976.
Law of June 23, 1976, ch. 76-237, 1976 Fla. Laws 556. The Florida Evidence Code appears in
chapter 90 of the State statutes. Fla. Stit. Ann. (West 1979). The Florida evidence rules substan-
tially follow the federal rules but contain numerous variations; omissions and additions. 13
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The line of Florida decisions in which human factors testimony was of-
fered began in 1971 with Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Hill In that case
decedent's automobile automobile crashed into the side of a train on an ex-
tremely dark, foggy night. Neither a flagman nor flares had been posted at the
crossing. Plaintiff alleged negligent operation of the train; defendant denied
this charge and counterclaimed contributory negligence. 8 At trial a human-
factors psychologist who had never seen the crossing or the decedent 9 testified
that an average driver would not have been able to gather adequate informa-
tion to react properly to the obstruction on the tracks. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the expert contended that the darkness, fog, absence of flares and absence
of sound would create perceptual problems for a driver.' 0
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the judge did not abuse his
discretion in concluding that the expert was qualified.' To decide whether
the subject matter was appropriate for expert testimony, the court examined
the expert's explanation of the causes of the perceptual difficulties. The court
concluded that "the subject matter of the opinion was not just the visibility of
the train on the crossing, but also the deceptive quality of various factors that
were present in the environment . . . , and the manner in which a person
would react to these factors."' 12 Such reactions could be found to lie beyond
the scope of the jurors' common knowledge and within the expert's sphere of
expertise. Finally, the court held that even if the decision to admit the expert
testimony was erroneous, there was sufficient independent evidence supporting
the jury's conclusion that the defendant was negligent to render the error
harmless.'
3
Four years later a different panel of the same court ruled that a human-
factors expert's opinion about the behavior of an average man in given cir-
cumstances was improperly admitted. In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v.
KubalskiM4 decedent's truck was stopped, during the day, on railroad tracks,
despite the presence of numerous warning devices.15 The court distinguished
U.L.A. 213 (1980). Differences involving expert testimony, however, are minor. The Florida Evi-
dence Code did not take effect until July 1, 1979. Law of June 21, 1978, ch. 78-379, § 1, 1978 Fla.
Laws 1052. Therefore, none of the human-factors decisions applied the federal rules in determin-
ing the admissibility of and limits on 'testimony in this area.
7. 250 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (2-1 decision), writ discharged, 270 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1972).
8. Id. at 313-15. In each of the Florida cases examined in this Note, plaintiffs employed
human-factors witnesses to demonstrate that there was no contributory negligence.
9. Id. at 314.
10. Id. at 315. Contra, St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Jackson, 242 Ark. 858, 416 S.W.2d 273
(1967) (factors such as position of the sun, elements distracting to motorists, weather and obstruc-
tions to vision are individually within the comprehension of the average juror); Owre v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 260 Or. 454, 490 P.2d 504 (1971) (expert testimony not permitted because the
distracting influences were hazards to good vision encountered regularly by motorists).
11. 250 So. 2d at 314. This decision to qualify the witness as an expert is criticized in text
accompanying notes 54-58 infra.
12. Id. at 315.
13. Id.
14. 323 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
15. Id. at 33.
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Hill by contending that the environmental conditions in that case amounted to
"extraordinary circumstances." Noting the absence of unusual circumstances,
the Kubalski court held that "inroads upon the province of the jury to decide
what the reasonable man should do" were unwarranted. 16 Because the testi-
mony by the human-factors expert, a president of a safety consulting firm,
may have significantly affected the jury's allocation of negligence, the court
further determined that the admission of this testimony was not harmless er-
ror. 17
In the only case not involving a railroad crossing accident, the trial court
in Public Health Foundation v. Cole 18 upheld the admissibility of human-fac-
tors testimony. Plaintiff was injured on the Fourth of July while diving into a
river on defendant's property. The accident occurred late in the afternoon as
the tide was receding; no warnings were posted about the presence of danger-
ous diving conditions at low tide.' 9 Plaintiff testified, however, that she had
intimate knowledge of the location of the accident and of most of the environ-
mental factors affecting the area. Furthermore, she had observed that the tide
was going out swiftly that afternoon, to the extent that she could "see shallow
places and deep places."20
When asked a hypothetical question posed in this factual context, Dr.
Isadore Scherer, the same expert witness who testified in Hill, concluded that a
reasonably prudent individual could have this accident because of the nature
of the situation and the other described factors. 2 ' In addition to the factors
already mentioned, Dr. Scherer took into account three other conditions. By
analyzing a survey map of the area, Scherer noted that plaintiff may have been
bothered by glare from the sun, making it more difficult to judge the depth of
the water. Murky water would also interfere with determining depth. Finally,
Dr. Scherer thought that the occurrence of the accident on the Fourth of July
was a significant variable. Because it was a holiday, plaintiff was happy and
enjoying herself, therefore, she may have dived into the river faster than she
ordinarily would.22 In drawing these conclusions, Dr. Scherer utilized the
16. Id. at 34. The court contrasted "extraordinary circumstances" with ordinary ones to ex-
plain the admission of expert testimony in Hill. Ordinary circumstances would be found to be
within the competence of the jury; therefore, expert testimony oi such conditions would be
barred.
17. Id. Decedent had been found 60% negligent, and the railroad 40% negligent. Were it not
for the prejudicial testimony, decedent's negligence might have been found to be even greater.
18. 352 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (2-1 decision) (none of the judges had been
on either the Hill or Kubalski panel) cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1978).
19. Id. at 879.
20. Id. at 880. When asked why the accident happened, plaintiff replied, "I don't know. I
guess I just didn't pay enough attention to the depth of the water." Id.
21. Id. at 880-81.
22. Id. at 881. With respect to plaintiffs intimate knowledge of the area, the expert noted
that habit inference would have downgraded her alertness to the situation, concluding that this
was another reason that a reasonably prudent person could have had the same accident. Id. On
the other hand, some courts have reasoned that familiarity with the scene of the accident makes it
more likely that the party is negligent. See, e.g., Owre v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 260 Or. 454,
490 P.2d 504 (1971) (testimony by consulting engineer regarding the difficulty of seeing traffic light
excluded since decedent knew of the light).
1981]
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deposition testimony of plaintiff and eyewitnesses, as well as photographs of
the scene of the accident and the survey map of the area.
23
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to
admit Dr. Scherer's testimony, reasoning that the opinion testimony was re-
lated to the deceptive quality of factors present in the environment. 24 This is
the same justification that the Hill court propounded.2- Since the environ-
mental conditions created a situation that may have been beyond the ordinary
experience and understanding of the jury, the Cole court determined that ex-
pert testimony was appropriate.
26
Although the Cole decision gives further support to admission of human-
factors testimony, the panel there came very close to setting aside the Hill
precedent. The concurring judge considered the decision in Hill an "unhappy
one" but reluctantly followed it because it was a precedent of his own court.
27
Believing that opinions on whether a party's conduct was negligent completely
usurp the jury's function, the judge did not think that the harmless error rule
could justify the decision. Because Dr. Scherer had concluded that a reason-
able person could have had this accident, the judge reasoned that the jury may
have been persuaded to ignore other evidence in finding Mrs. Cole totally free
of negligence.
28
Finally, the most recent Florida case that considered the admissibility of
human-factors testimony, Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Buchman,
29 in-
volved a complicated intersection of railroad tracks and highways, and the
questionable audibility of the train whistle. Even though the train's
headlamps were on and its bell had been ringing continuously, decedent had
never slowed while approaching the crossing.30 The trial judge admitted testi-
mony given by two human-factors experts. The first expert, Frank Fowler,
testified that a number of "confusion factors" were present at the crossing.
These included the multiple intersections of highways and crossings, the slight
incline of the railroad crossing and the restricted view of the tracks because of
an orange grove.31 The second expert, Norman Korobow, stated that eighty to
eighty-seven percent of the population would not have been able to hear the
whistle, a conclusion he based on the facts in evidence, including the velocity
of the wind on the day of the accident.
32
23. 352 So. 2d at 881.
24. Id. at 879.
25. 250 So. 2d at 315. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
26. 352 So. 2d at 879. Physical conditions that the court mentioned included the angle of the
sun, glare, the tide and overall weather conditions.
27. Id. at 882.
28. Id.
29. 358 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), reversed, 381 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1980).
30. Id. at 837.
31. Id. at 840.
32. Id. Also, at the time of the accident, decedent had the car radio turned on and the win-
dows rolled up. Id. at 837.
A third expert, not a human-factors expert, testified about the absence of proper warning
devices at the crossing. Id. at 840-41. Similar testimony was excluded in Hill because it was
found to be within the comprehension of the jury. 250 So. 2d at 314.
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The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's determi-
nation of admissibility. Because it was particularly concerned with the preju-
dicial effect that improper expert testimony could have on the jury in this case
because there was no independent evidence of negligence on the part of the
railroad, the court held that the confusion factors were within the jury's expe-
rience.33 While mention of these factors would have been appropriate in the
closing argument of counsel, allowing Fowler to make these observations, in
the court's view, unduly influenced the jury and invaded its province.34 The
Buchman court rejected Korobow's testimony for a different reason. Because
of the absence of extraordinary circumstances, testimony concerning the abil-
ity of the general populace to hear the whistle was unwarranted. 35
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the court of appears decision in
Buchman in its first consideration 36 of the admissibility of human-factors testi-
mony. The court37 relied upon the Hill "deceptive quality of the environ-
ment" test and referred to the Kubalski unusual circumstances distinction, in
finding conditions sufficiently analogous to warrant expert testimony.
38
Rather than invading the province of the jury, the expert testimony would
assist the jury in its deliberations. 39 The dissent maintained, however, that no
unusual circumstances existed; hence, the jury should have been free to draw
its own conclusions.4°
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Florida's test of
admissibility of expert testimony was whether the facts to be determined were
obscure and not within the ordinary experience of the jury. Florida courts
restricted admission to situations in which special knowledge or experience
was necessary to draw a valid conclusion.4 1 For this reason, courts consider-
ing the admissibility of human-factors testimony felt constrained to support
their decisions by showing that the particular facts evidenced "extraordinary
33. 358 So. 2d at 841-42.
34. Id. at 842. For explanation of the use of the phrase "invades the province of the jury,"
see C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 12 (2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978).
35. 358 So. 2d at 842. The court questioned the reliability of Korobow's opinion, since his
testimony did not imply that the responsibility of motorists to be alert for trains was a factor given
consideration in his analysis. Id. at 840.
36. Trial courts allowed human-factors testimony in two cases that preceded Buchman to the
supreme court. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Welfare, 350 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1977), quashed, 373 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1979); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Heliman, 330 So. 2d 761
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976), quashed, 349 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 1977). Neither the appellate nor the
supreme court opinion in Helman analyzes admissibility of the testimony. In Welfare, however,
the Florida Supreme Court considered the human-factors evidence as proper-in dicta--over the
dissent of Justice Alderman.
37. Buchman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 381 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1980).
38. Id. at 230.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 231 (Alderman, J., dissenting). One of the two dissenting justices was, ironically,
Justice Alderman, who had written the Cole opinion while serving on the appellate court. His
dissent emphasized that the jury was fully competent to appreciate the conditions existing at the
time of the accident.
41. Mills v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 127 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). The court
noted that if expert testimony were permitted in instances when the jury was competent, there was




circumstances" or a "deceptive quality of the environment." Either character-
istic would remove the subject matter from the ordinary experience of the jury.
The major difficulty, however, lies in determining what circumstances are ex-
traordinary. The Hill court noted such factors as darkness, fog, and absence
of flares in deciding that human-factors testimony was admissible. Arguably,
each of these conditions is well within the common knowledge of jurors.42
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 considerably simplifies this problem. As
long as the testimony will assist the jury, it is admissible.43 Under rule 702
expert testimony pertaining to a particular subject should be permitted when-
ever it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining
a fact in issue.44 This is a more liberal standard than the traditional common
law requirement that the subject of the testimony must be beyond the compre-
hension of the average layman.45 Thus, under the statutory standard, even
though a layman has a fundamental grasp of a particular issue or subject, a
court may still permit expert testimony if it would provide additional aid to
the jury.46 When the trier of fact is as competent as the expert to evaluate an
issue, however, the use of expert testimony should be precluded. 47
The Florida Supreme Court advanced this assistance rationale when sup-
porting the trial judge's admission of expert testimony in Buchman,48 even
though the assistance test was not in effect at the time of the trial.49 As will be
seen below, it is doubtful that human-factors opinions genuinely help the jury
make a more informed decision than it could make on its own.50
Even if expert testimony would be helpful to interpret certain informa-
tion, the judge must still decide whether the prospective witness possesses the
42. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. Of course, one reason that human-factors
testimony may still be appropriate despite the jury's ability to comprehend the individual factors
is that multiple factors may combine to create an environment with which the jury is unfamiliar.
43. Fed. R. Evid. 702, Adv. Comm. Note.
44. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Masson, 582 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1978) (testimony of quali-
fied expert regarding gambling operations necessary to aid jury in understanding taped conversa-
tions in the jargon of this business).
45. See C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 13. Although North Carolina has yet to adopt the
federal rules, decisions of the state courts generally apply the federal standard. See, e.g., Hubbard
v. Quality Oil Co., 268 N.C. 489, 151 S.E.2d 71 (1966) (proper test is whether additional light can
be thrown on question under investigation by qualified expert). But see Glenn v. Smith, 264 N.C.
706, 142 S.E.2d 596 (1965) (testimony about the propensity of an automobile to fishtail not al-
lowed).
46. Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1975) (witness with Ph.D. in
engineering mechanics and familiar with principles of agricultural machinery would have pro-
vided assistance to the jury concerning the defective design of a corn picker); Englehart v. Jeep
Corp., 122 Ariz. 256, 594 P.2d 510 (1979) (applying federal rules, court held that experts could
draw conclusions more precisely and scientifically than the average juror).
47. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, (1962) (expert testimony may be excluded
iffjury is as capable of comprehending primary facts and drawing correct conclusions as are wit-
nesses who have had special training); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (Ct.
App. 1978) (jury as competent as an expert to determine whether the warning 'Flammable Liquid'
was adequate).
48. 381 So. 2d at 230.
49. Because the appellate decision came down in 1978, the trial must have occurred well
before the Florida Evidence Code took effect on July 1, 1979.
50. See text accompanying notes 58-84 infra.
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requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to qualify as an
expert in his particular field.51 If the witness can assist the trier of fact, he
should qualify.5 2 Once the witness is classified as an expert, questions related
to his background and credibility affect the weight to be given his testimony,
not its admissibility.
5 3
Of the four cases under consideration, only in Hill did the appellate court
analyze the qualifications of the human-factors witness. Presumably, this
question was not at issue in later cases because of the difficulty of establishing
that the trial judge abused his discretion, a condition for proving an admission
error.54 To support the trial court's admission of expert testimony, the Hill
court concluded from Dr. Scherer's testimony that he had considerable aca-
demic and practical experience in his field of psychology. Specifically, the
court referred to Dr. Scherer's statement that he had done "research relating to
motivation, attention, and other variables in personal history which relate to a
person's inability to work. . .[and] research into the subject of the requisite
knowledge and ability for the operation of machinery. '55 Neither operation
of machinery nor inability to work, however, seems to have any bearing on the
subject matter of the expert's testimony-the effect of certain environmental
factors on the perception of the average automobile driver. When an expert's
testimony departs from his field of knowledge, any further opinions may mis-
lead the trier of fact. Thus, courts must consider whether a witness qualifies as
an expert with respect to the subject matter of his proposed testimony.56 Al-
though Dr. Scherer would certainly qualify as an expert in his areas of spe-
cialty, the Hill court was not warranted in admitting his testimony without
establishing the relationship between his credentials and perception
problems.57 Neither an unqualified witness nor an expert testifying outside his
51. Fed. R. Evid. 702. See generally C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 13.
52. United States v. Lopez, 543 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1976) (trial judge made meaningful exam-
ination of psychologist's qualifications before excluding his testimony), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111
(1977).
The tests for appropriateness of subject matter and qualifications of prospective experts are
apparently the same-assistance to the trier of fact. Thus, while expert testimony on a particular
topic may be appropriate, a particular expert witness may not be personally capable of providing
the requisite assistance.
53. United States v. Fortune, 513 F.2d 883, (5th Cir.), (trier of fact to determine questions of
credibility), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1020 (1975); Behm v. Division of Administration, 336 So. 2d
579 (Fla. 1976) (jury to decide credibility to be given expert testimony).
A court may still reject expert testimony if a reasonable basis for the opinions is not estab-
lished. For example, an accident reconstruction expert may not give an opinion on the point of
imact based solely on eyewitness testimony, since experts in this field generally require more
information to formulate an opinion. Fed. R. Evid. 703, Adv. Comm. Note.
54. Berdeaux v. Gamble Alden Life Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 987, 990 (5th Cir. 1976); Buchman v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 381 So. 2d 229, 230 (Fla. 1980).
55. 250 So. 2d at 314. No other qualifications or explanations were given by the Hill court.
56. Perkins v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 596 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1979) (specialist in mechanical
engineering, who had no automobile design background, allowed to testify on general engineering
principles but not as an expert on automobile design). But cf. United States v. Viglia, 549 F.2d
335, (5th Cir.) (expert whose principal area of practice was pediatrics and who did not treat obes-
ity held to have sufficient medical training to testify on the use of controlled substances to treat
obesity), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
57. When expert testimony is based upon false assumptions, Florida courts have not always
1981]
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realm of expertise can provide the necessary assistance to the jury required
both by Florida's pre-Federal Rules test and by rule 702.
Although recognizing the importance of establishing the credentials of an
expert witness, the Florida courts totally failed to consider another crucial test
of admissibility of human-factors testimony-whether it qualifies as scientific
evidence.58 Not every ostensibly scientific technique should be recognized as
the foundation for expert testimony. The trier of fact may be unduly influ-
enced by an expert claiming a scientific basis for his opinion because of the
expert's apparent objectivity. Moreover, rebuttal of such an opinion can be
accomplished only through use of other experts or by cross-examination based
on a thorough acquaintance with the underlying principles.
59
If the state of the expert's field has not developed to the point that his
opinions have a reasonable scientific basis, the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not permit the testimony.60 Opinions that fail to satisfy this requirement can-
not furnish assistance to the jury as required by rule 702.61 Nevertheless, there
must be an opportunity for new fields of scientific and specialized knowledge
to be verified by courts as reliable. "[N]either newness nor lack of absolute
certainty suffices to render it inadmissible. . . . Every useful new develop-
ment must have its first day in court." 62 During that first day in court, how-
ever, the judge must scrutinize innovative developments before ruling that the
proferred expert testimony is admissible.
63
Two recent decisions by federal courts of appeals analyze many of the
factors that should be considered when determining the admissibility of a new
scientific method. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United
followed the rule that questions concerning the evidence go to its weight, not its admissiblity. See
E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (jury verdict
not sustained because expert's conclusion that a product was defective and unfit for its intended
use was unsupported by the facts; therefore, the testimony had no probative value), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 961 (1974).
58. See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
See generally Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom, 38 Md.
L. Rev. 539 (1979).
59. United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 362-63 (6th Cir. 1979).
The traditional standard for admission of scientific evidence is promulgated in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For a scientific principle or discovery to be admissible, the
Frye test required that the principle "be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
Recent decisions have emphasized that reliability of the scientific technique is the most im-
portant factor in determining general acceptance. E.g., United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
60. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (Ist Cir. 1979). See generally C. McCormick, supra
note 34, § 13.
61. Cf. United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979) (testimony must be helpful to the
trier of fact and is also subject to exclusion under rule 403 if it will confuse the issues).
62. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994
(1971).
A scientific technique developed specifically for use in a particular trial may even be admissi-
ble, giving further credence to the view that reliability is the courts' major concern. See Cop-
polino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (expert testimony evaluating test developed
for trial to determine presence of poison in body of defendant's wife held admissible), appeal
dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
63. See C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 203.
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States v. Williams,64 permitted spectrographic voice analysis65 to be presented
through expert testimony. The court emphasized the high percentage of suc-
cessful voice identifications as well as the expert's certification in his field and
extensive practical experience. The expert's opinion had a minimal potential
to mislead, since the jury could examine the objective components of the tests.
Finally, normal safeguards were available, including the opportunity to chal-
lenge the reliability of the equipment and the technique of analysis, and to
question the expert's qualifications.
66
In United States v. Fosher6 7 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a psycholo-
gist's testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. The
court reasoned that proof offered to assist the jury must provide a system of
analysis that will be reasonably likely to add to the common understanding of
a particular issue.68 Thus, an expert must give some indication of how he
reached his opinion. With no such system evident in Fosher, the court deter-
mined that the jury was as capable of assessing an eyewitness' ability to per-
ceive and remember an assailant as the proffered expert. The Fosher court
upheld the trial court's conclusion that the expert testimony was not "suffi-
ciently beyond the ken of lay jurors to satisfy Rule 702."69 Moreover, admis-
sion of opinions based on scientific subject matter of unproven reliability
would raise a substantial danger of prejudice, given the aura of reliability sur-
rounding scientific evidence. 70
Florida courts have reached the same conclusion in excluding opinions on
the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In Nelson v. State7l the expert
never examined the victim of an attack who had subsequently identified her
assailant. The trial court rejected testimony concerning factors that might af-
fect perception and the memory process in general. On review, the appellate
court supported this exclusion, observing that the expert's opinion was largely
comprised of hypotheses, theories, generalization and speculation.72 Courts in
64. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
65. This is commonly known as voiceprint identification. It involves examination of spectro-
graphic representations of the human voice, with the skill of the examiner being the critical f ctor
in the degree of success. C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 204, at 489 n.31. See generally Kamine,
The Voiceprint Technique, 6 San Diego L. Rev. 213 (1969).
66. 583 F.2d at 1198-1200. But see People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478
(1966) (even extensive qualifications of the expert in the fields of speech and acoustical engineer-
ing may be insufficient to justify admissibility).
67. 590 F.2d 381 (lst Cir. 1979).
68. Id. at 383. The court was obviously concerned that expert testimony in this area could be
quite arbitrary. If the jury does not have a means to interpret the testimony, it is apparent that the
expert opinions will be of no assistance.
69. Id. at 383.
70. The court held that, "[q]uite apart from questions of limited relevance and reliability,"
rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the trial court to exclude evidence whose proba-
tive value is outweighed by the danger of confusion and prejudice. Id. The possibility of
prejudice in criminal cases, such as Fosher, may also raise constitutional questions about the right
of a defendant to a fair trial.
71. 362 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
72. Id. at 1021.
19811
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other jurisdictions have generally concurred.73
Many of these weaknesses are found in the human-factors cases. For ex-
ample, there is no evidence that any of the witnesses had firsthand knowledge
of the settings of the accidents. At best they developed familiarity by studying
photographs and survey maps,74 at worst through an attorney's recitation of
facts in a hypothetical question.75 As in Nelson, the expert opinions dealt not
with the perceptions and reactions of the specific person involved in the acci-
dents but with how the general population, as typified by the average76 or
reasonable77 man, would have responded to this situation.
Some human-factors testimony goes further and becomes entirely conjec-
tural. In the Cole case, Dr. Scherer stated that looking into the sun would
have made it more difficult for plaintiff to judge the depth factor. That plain-
tiff dove in the direction of the sun, however, was not deduced from testimony
but from the expert's examination of a map of the region.78 Dr. Scherer was
also speculating when he concluded that plaintiff may have acted faster on the
day of the accident simply because it was a holiday.79 Furthermore, he failed
to establish the basis for his determination that a holiday causes reckless ac-
tions.80 Without further explanation or justification for his conclusion, Dr.
Scherer's statement does not appear to satisfy the assistance test.
Similarly, Professor Korobow's conclusion in Buchman that at the mini-
mum eighty percent of the population would not have been able to hear the
train whistle lacks a method of analysis that the jury could use to indepen-
dently evaluate the testimony.8' More important, however, is whether such a
conclusion is reliable. The voice print evidence in Williams showed a high
correlation between actual voices and test identifications. 82 Without a "de-
monstrable, objective procedure for reaching the opinion and qualified per-
sons who can either duplicate the result or criticize the means by which it was
reached,"83 testimony based on a scientific field should not be admitted. The
73. See State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1979); State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465 (R.I.
1979). But see People v. Hurley, 95 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1979) (dissenting opin-
ion) (testimony related to misidentifications would be of assistance).
The Galloway case indicates a recurring problem with expert testimony, that of the profes-
sional witness. Defendant in this Iowa case offered Dr. Elizabeth Loftus as the expert, the same
witness whose testimony was rejected in the Florida Nelson decision. For proposals to improve
the practice of employing experts, see C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 17.
74. Public Health Foundation v. Cole, 352 So. 2d at 880.
75. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Hill, 250 So. 2d at 314.
76. Id. at 315; Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Kubalski, 323 So. 2d at 33.
77. 352 So. 2d at 879. See also Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Buchman, 358 So. 2d at 840
(expert opinion that a minimum of 80% of population would not have been able to hear whistle).
78. 352 So. 2d at 880. Dr. Scherer himself characterized as only a possibility his conclusion
that plaintiff was unable to see because of the direction she was facing. Id.
79. Id.
80. Scherer testified, "[lit is the Fourth of July. She is feeling happy. She is enjoying herself.
It is a holiday, and she just jumps so that the emotional tone was set for doing something like
this." Id.
81. 358 So. 2d at 840.
82. 583 F.2d at 1198-99.
83. United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1979).
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unproven reliability of human-factors testimony leads one to the conclusion
that the jury has the ability to analyze the same variables and make determi-
nations just as valid as those of the experts.
84
While the Florida courts committed a serious error by failing to establish
the reliability of human-factors testimony, they made a graver mistake by ac-
cepting testimony concerning the behavior of the reasonably prudent person.
Until recent years a general doctrine existed that no witness, expert or not,
could state opinions or conclusions about an ultimate issue of fact. Issues of
law, such as whether a person's action constituted negligence, were even fur-
ther removed from the province of witnesses than issues of fact.85 Following
the general trend of relaxing this doctrine, Federal Rule of Evidence 704 (rule
703 in Florida) formally removes the bar to testimony that includes an ulti-
mate issue of fact.8 6 All other requirements for admission must still be satis-
fied.8
7
Decisions by state supreme courts in Oregon and North Dakota are indic-
ative of conflicting approaches to the question of admitting testimony on legal
standards. In the Oregon case,88 which involved facts similar to those in the
Florida human-factors cases, the court held that an expert in railroad crossing
safety should not have been permitted to testify that the crossing was ex-
trahazardous. The Oregon test of this "extrahazardous" standard is whether a
reasonably prudent person can use a crossing safely. Despite the witness' ex-
perience in designing railroad crossings, the court ruled him incompetent to
aid the jury on this question because he possessed no special knowledge of the
characteristics of the reasonably prudent person.8 9 The court barred only the
conclusion about the standard of law, however, and allowed testimony on the
factors that increased the dangerousness of the crossing and the preventive
measures that could have been taken.
The North Dakota court,90 holding that a qualified expert could give an
opinion whether a crossing was extrahazardous, applied rule 702 and deter-
84. Psychological evidence may fail to provide accuracy greater than would occur by chance.
See Comment, supra note 58, at 599. Though advocating curtailment of psychologists testifying as
experts, the author of this Comment supports a continuation of the psychologist's role in interpret-
ing human behavior based on firsthand knowledge. Id. at 599 n.286.
85. See generally C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 12.
North Carolina retains the traditional "ultimate issue" rule. The form of the question may
determine admissibility of the opinion. Given a hypothetical question, an expert may state what
causes would lead to a particular result, yet an assertion that the result was actually produced by a
particular cause is inadmissible. Also inadmissible is expert testimony that is speculative or con-
jectural. Hubbard v. Quality Oil Co., 268 N.C. 489, 151 S.E.2d 71 (1966).
86. Fed. R. Evid. 704; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.703 (West 1979).
87. United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1979). See Fed. R. Evid. 704, Adv.
Comm. Note.
88. Koch v. Southern Pac. Co., 266 Or. 335, 513 P.2d 770 (1973).
89. Id. at 343-44, 513 P.2d at 774. The court noted that the expert was asked "not what a
reasonably prudent railroad crossing designer or builder would do, but whether a reasonably pru-
dent automobile driver could safely use the crossing. . . ," and held that this was "not the subject
of expert testimony." Id. at 347, 513 P.2d at 775. But see Harrell v. City of Belen, 93 N.M. 601,
603 P.2d 711 (1979) (clinical psychologist permitted to give opinion as to what would have been a
reasonable action for the police to.have taken to prevent decedent's suicide).
90. South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1980).
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mined that an expert could offer assistance on a legal question. The expert
was a civil engineer who had researched highway traffic patterns as well as
driver behavior and reactions. Since he was intimately familiar with both de-
sign of roads and how drivers react to dangers, the expert could assist the jury
in determining whether the crossing was extrahazardous. 91
Compared to the North Dakota approach, the Oregon court's view-that
no expert could ever be qualified to voice an opinion concerning the behavior
of the reasonable person-is more consistent with the tradition of leaving the
determination of ultimate legal issues to the trier of fact. 92 The Federal Rules
of Evidence seem to be in accord with this reasoning, although there is no
specific exclusion of opinions on ultimate legal issues. Two justifications for
exclusion may be derived from the assistance requirement of rule 702. First,
no witness can be an expert on the behavior of the reasonably prudent person,
since the reasonable person is a mythical one, "not to be identified with any
ordinary individual. '93 Accordingly, an expert has no basis for his testimony
and cannot satisfy the assistance test. Second, opinions that only instruct the
trier of fact on which result to reach also fail to provide the requisite assist-
ance. 9
4
Of the four Florida human-factors cases discussed above, the Cole deci-
sion went the farthest in admitting improper legal standard testimony. Dr.
Scherer testified that a reasonably prudent person could have had plaintiff's
accident,95 thus effectively concluding that plaintiff was not negligent. Dr.
Scherer's qualifications to testify as an expert on perception difficulties, appear
to be questionable,96 and certainly do not indicate that he could be classified
as an expert on the reasonably prudent person standard. His testimony would
also be barred under the traditional approach, which reserves determination of
ultimate legal issues to the jury alone,
How the Federal Rules of Evidence will affect future decisions about ad-
mission of human-factors testimony in Florida and other jurisdictions is un-
clear. The standard for admission of expert testimony since adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, is whether proffered opinions will assist the trier of
fact. The former test was whether the subject matter of the opinion exceeds
the scope of knowledge of the average layperson. Although the Florida
Supreme Court in Buchman recognized the propriety of the current standard,
the court applied it only superficially. Since the jury had to consider questions
91. Id. at 831 (the court specified that its determination of admissibility was made with re-
spect to rule 702).
92. See C. McCormick, supra note 34, § 12.
93. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 32, at 151 (4th ed. 1971).
94. Fed. R. Evid. 704, Adv. Comm. Note (opinions that tell the jury what result to reach do
not meet the rule 702 requirement of assisting the jury and also violate the rule 403 provision
against evidence that, although relevant, wastes time). See Stoler v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 583
F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1978) (although noting that there has not been a conclusive determination
concerning admissibility of ultimate legal opinions, court held that exclusion of such an opinion
was not an abuse of discretion).
95. 352 So. 2d at 879-81.
96. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
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of driver reaction time and whistle audibility, subjects on which two human-
factors specialists had testified at trial, the court held that the assistance re-
quirement was satisfied. 97 By failing to determine whether human-factors tes-
timony met the level of reliability necessary to qualify as scientifically based,
the supreme court created the substantial possibility that the foundation of the
jury's negligence determination consisted of invalid expert conclusions.
Similarly, prejudice98 arises when a witness testifies on a subject outside
his area of expertise, as in Hill. And if a witness is not an expert on the spe-
cific topic that he addresses, his opinions cannot assist the jury. Finally, con-
clusions about the behavior of the reasonably prudent person only declare
what result the jury should reach rather than provide any assistance. Such
testimony should always be rejected as being "an unwarranted incursion into
the sphere of influence belonging solely to the jury."99
To counter the danger of prejudice, the Florida Evidence Code provides
for significant attorney input into the decision to admit expert testimony. Rule
705 stipulates that a party opposing admission of an expert opinion may con-
duct a voir dire examination of the proposed witness before trial. If prima
facie evidence that the witness lacks sufficient basis for his opinion is estab-
lished, the court will bar the testimony, subject to subsequent proof of the
basis. 100 Federal rule 705 allows cross-examination of the expert at trial con-
cerning his basis but does not specifically provide for pretrial probing.101
Thus, an alert attorney in Florida may prevent testimony before the jury by an
expert who is not sufficiently qualified or whose field is not scientifically relia-
ble. This system is more effective than allowing an expert to testify and then
relying on cross-examination to correct misconceptions in the minds of the
jurors.
It remains the ultimate responsibility of the courts themselves, however,
to bar opinions on legal standards. If the jury is to have a more meaningful
role in the trial process than that of a conduit for experts' determinations, con-
clusions on whether particular conduct satisfies the applicable legal standard
should remain solely with the jury. Human-factors testimony should be chal-
lenged by opposing counsel and excluded by the court unless it is demon-
strated that the evidence has scientific reliability. Otherwise, there is a
97. 381 So. 2d at 230.
98. If the prejudicial impact of expert opinion evidence substantially outweighs its probative
value, such evidence may be excluded by the trial court. United States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198
(5th Cir. 1977).
The Florida courts that rejected human factors testimony were concerned with the prejudicial
impact that improper expert testimony could have on a jury. That the jury might have reached
the same verdict based on evidence independent from the expert opinions did not justify deeming
the expert opinions harmless error. Kubalski, 323 So. 2d at 34. Moreover, unnecessary expert
testimony can have the effect of unduly influencing the jury's determination of negligqnce. Buch-
man, 358 So. 2d at 842.
99. 352 So. 2d at 880 (Downey, J., concurring).
100. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.705(2) (West 1979).
101. Fed. R. Evid. 705.
1981]
424 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
significant danger that the functions of the jury will be usurped by the human-
factors "expert."
ROBERT LYMAN DEWEY
